主题｜Topic：Self-Commitment for Cooperation
时间｜Time：06.19（周一）14: 00-15: 30
地点｜Venue：文澴楼教室｜Class Room 711，WENHUAN
主讲｜Speaker
Jaimie Wei-Hung Lien，美国卫尔斯利女子学院学士，美国加利福尼亚大学圣地亚哥分校硕士、博士，山东大学经济研究院教授、博士生导师，山大特聘教授。
研究领域包括：行为经济学、实验经济学、应用微观经济学，研究主题涉及合作互惠、参照依赖、现时偏误、代表性偏误等重要行为现象。先后主持过国家自然科学基金项目、教育部科研项目、香港研究资助局项目。目前已有论文发表于Nature Communications、PNAS、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior等国际知名期刊。曾获"中国信息经济学2016青年创新奖"、"中国信息经济学2018青年创新奖"和"中国信息经济学2011-2015理论贡献奖"。
摘要｜Abstract
We propose a new mechanism to promote socially efficient behavior in games where individual strategic incentives distinctly discourage it, as exemplified by the classic Prisoner's Dilemma game. Our belief-free mechanism, which allows individuals to make a self-commitment regarding their future behavior, is fully voluntary for participants and maximizes social welfare in equilibrium, contrary to previously studied mechanisms which involve external or peer enforcement through costly punishment or reward. A laboratory experiment demonstrates that the mechanism is highly effective, producing significantly higher average cooperation rates over a ten-round experiment than in the control group, and increasing cooperation rates over time in contrast to the decreasing cooperation rates in the control group. Analysis shows that the mechanism succeeds through high participation rates in self-commitment, and in turn, high cooperation rates in the Prisoner's Dilemma among those who voluntarily committed. The mechanism has the advantage of being easy to implement, and thus can serve as an effective practical approach to encouraging cooperative behavior without institutional enforcement.
